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Should New York Courts Hear Certified
Questions from the Securities and
Exchange Commission?
Verity Winship*
Most states, including New York, allow their highest courts
to consider unresolved questions of state law “certified” to them
by certain federal courts.1  In 2007, Delaware expanded its
scope of certification, allowing questions to be certified to its
highest court by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”).2  This essay evaluates whether New York should follow
Delaware’s lead and authorize the New York Court of Appeals
to hear certified questions from the SEC.
The essay first examines New York’s current law governing
whether and when unresolved questions of New York law can
be certified to the New York Court of Appeals.  It then describes
Delaware’s recent amendment expanding certification to the
SEC.  The remainder of the essay identifies benefits and costs of
amending the New York constitution and rules to allow the
New York Court of Appeals to hear certified questions from the
SEC.  It concludes that, while Delaware’s predominance in
number of incorporations may limit the practical impact of such
a rule outside of Delaware, such a rule in New York might sig-
nal the primacy of state actors in determining corporate law
and challenge Delaware’s control over U.S. corporate law.
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Cardozo School of Law.  I am grateful to Stew-
art Sterk for conversations about the project.  Errors and omissions remain my
own.
1. See Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State
Law to State Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 159 &
n.13 (2003) (citing state laws enabling certification procedures); Eric Eisenberg,
Note, A Divine Comity: Certification (At Last) in North Carolina, 58 DUKE L.J. 69,
71 (2008) (noting that North Carolina is the only state not to have adopted a certi-
fication procedure).
2. See Act of May 3, 2007, Pub. Act No. 37, 76 Del. Laws 37 (codified as
amended at DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8)).
575
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I. Current New York Law Allowing Certified Questions
Certification of unresolved questions of state law has be-
come widely accepted, with all but one state allowing the state’s
highest court to answer certified questions from federal judges.3
In New York, a constitutional provision requires the New York
Court of Appeals to adopt a rule allowing certification “by the
Supreme Court of the United States, a court of appeals of the
United States or an appellate court of last resort of another
state . . . .”4  Questions may be certified if they “may be determi-
native of the cause then pending in the certifying court
and . . . are not controlled by precedent in the decisions of the
courts of New York.”5
Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the New York
Court of Appeals has adopted a court rule of practice allowing
such certification.6  The rule states that the U.S. Supreme
Court, any U.S. Court of Appeals, or state courts of last resort
may certify a “determinative” or “dispositive” question of law to
the New York Court of Appeals for which “no controlling prece-
dent of the [New York] Court of Appeals exists.”7  The New York
Court of Appeals has accepted such certified questions.  For in-
stance, the Court of Appeals decided whether a Saudi Arabian
citizen was “transacting business” in New York such that he
was subject to personal jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm
statute after the federal appellate court certified that question
to the Court of Appeals.8  It has also rejected certified questions
when, for instance, they were not dispositive or were unlikely to
arise in state court.9
3. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 71.
4. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(9).
5. Id.
6. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 22, § 500.27(a) (2009).
7. Id.
8. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 831-32 (N.Y. 2007). See also
Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified
Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 401 (2000) (evaluating New
York’s experience with certification from federal courts).
9. See, e.g., Yesil v. Reno, 705 N.E.2d 655, 656 (N.Y. 1998), declining certifica-
tion from No. 97-2629, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 38253 (2d Cir. Sept. 18, 1998) (de-
clining to hear a certified question concerning personal jurisdiction over a federal
immigration official because the issue was not dispositive and was unlikely to arise
in state court).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/12
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II. The Delaware Example
Delaware, like most states, allows certification of questions
to its highest court.  According to Delaware’s constitutional pro-
vision and the court rule it enabled, the Delaware Supreme
Court—the Delaware equivalent of the New York Court of Ap-
peals—may hear certified questions from the U.S. Supreme
Court, U.S. Courts of Appeals, and other states’ courts of last
resort.10  Unlike the New York Court of Appeals, it may also
hear certified questions from other Delaware courts and U.S.
District Courts.11  Moreover, the standard for certification is not
that the question be “determinative” or “dispositive,” but rather
that it “appear[ ] to the [Delaware] Supreme Court that there
are important and urgent reasons for an immediate determina-
tion of such questions by it.”12
In the summer of 2007, the Delaware legislature broadened
the category of certified questions even further by amending the
Delaware Constitution to allow the Delaware Supreme Court to
hear certified questions from the SEC.13  The legislative history
of these amendments is meager.  The Senate’s version of the bill
says merely that “[t]he purpose of this amendment is to add the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission to the list
of entities that may certify questions of law to the Delaware Su-
preme Court,”14 and that “[m]ore than half of the publicly
traded companies in the United States are Delaware
corporations.”15
These amendments to Delaware’s laws affect only the reach
of Delaware’s courts; nothing in them can force the SEC to take
advantage of this new possibility.  Nonetheless, the SEC chose
to certify a question to the Delaware Supreme Court in June
10. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 41(a)(ii).
11. See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 41(a)(i), (ii).
12. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8). See also DEL. SUP. CT. R. 41(a), (b).
13. See Act of May 3, 2007, Pub. Act No. 37, 76 Del. Laws 37 (codified as
amended at DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8)).  The Rules of the Supreme Court of the
State of Delaware were subsequently amended to conform to this constitutional
amendment. See DEL. SUP. CT. R. 4 (a)(ii). See also J.W. Verret, Federal vs. State
Law: The SEC’s New Ability to Certify Questions to the Delaware Supreme Court,
CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 12 & n.1.
14. S. 62, 144th Gen. Assem., 76 Del. Laws 37 (2007).
15. Id.
3
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2008,16 and the Delaware Supreme Court accepted and decided
the issue.17  The certified question in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Em-
ployees Pension Plan (“CA, Inc.”), was whether a proposed cor-
porate bylaw exceeded shareholder powers under state law or
would otherwise violate state law.18
Under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the SEC is tasked with regulating proxy solicitations.19  Compa-
nies can exclude shareholder proposals from proxy materials
only if they fall into one of the categories listed in the SEC’s
proxy rules.20  Two bases for exclusion explicitly involve state
law.  The proposal may be excluded if it “is not a proper subject
for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of
the company’s organization,”21 or “[i]f the proposal would, if im-
plemented, cause the company to violate any state, federal, or
foreign law to which it is subject.”22  Companies seeking to ex-
clude a proposal request that the SEC issue a letter indicating
that it will not take enforcement action against the company for
omitting the proposal.23  Although technically non-binding,
these SEC “no-action letters” comprise a relatively well-devel-
oped source of interpretations of the securities laws.24
To evaluate the request for a no-action letter in CA, Inc.,
the SEC had to determine whether the proposal mandating re-
imbursement of dissident shareholders’ proxy solicitation ex-
penses was a proper subject for action by shareholders under
16. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ARISING
FROM RULE 14A-8 PROPOSAL BY SHAREHOLDER OF CA, INC. (June 27, 2008), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/ca14a8cert.pdf [hereinafter SEC. EXCH.
COMM’N, CERTIFICATION]. See also CA, Inc., SEC No Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 495, at *1-2 (June 27, 2008) (informing parties to the action of the
question’s certification to the Delaware Supreme Court).
17. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del.
2008).
18. Id. at 231. See also SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, CERTIFICATION, supra note 16.
19. 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) (2006).
20. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2009).
21. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(1).
22. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(2).
23. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF CORP. FIN., STAFF LEGAL BULLETIN NO.
14, SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS (2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/
cfslb14.htm.
24. See Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in
SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 921 (1998) (arguing that courts should defer to regulatory positions in no-
action letters only when they are persuasive).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/12
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Delaware law and whether, if adopted, it would cause the com-
pany to violate Delaware law.25  Each side submitted an opinion
from a Delaware law firm concerning the content of Delaware
law.26  Faced with competing interpretations, the SEC certified
the question to the Delaware Supreme Court,27 which decided
that shareholders have the power to pass bylaws but that the
proposal, as phrased in CA, Inc., would violate Delaware law
because it could prevent the board from exercising its fiduciary
duties to decide whether reimbursement was appropriate at
all.28
III. The Practical Consequences of Following
Delaware’s Example
One of the basic questions is whether the SEC could or
would certify a question to New York’s—as opposed to Dela-
ware’s—courts.  The limited circumstances in which the SEC
considers state law and the predominance of Delaware incorpo-
ration among U.S. corporations suggest that certification by the
SEC to New York or other non-Delaware courts would be
infrequent.
First, the primary task of the SEC is to enforce the federal
securities laws, and not to determine state law.29  Nonetheless,
the SEC sometimes must determine state law, as the single cer-
tified question to date illustrates.  Whether a shareholder pro-
posal can be excluded from a proxy statement may turn on its
consistency with state law.30  According to the applicable SEC
regulation, the subject of the shareholder proposal must be “a
proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the
jurisdiction of the company’s organization,” whether New York,
Delaware, or some other jurisdiction.31  This requirement
means that the question could arise in any state of incorpora-
25. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, CERTIFICATION, supra note 16.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237, 240
(Del. 2008).
29. See, e.g., SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 8, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2008.pdf.
30. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231; SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, CERTIFICATION, supra
note 16.
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2009).
5
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tion, including New York.  However, it also suggests that the
frequency with which the opportunity for certification arises de-
pends on the number of incorporations.  Notably, opportunities
for certification by the SEC are likely less frequent (or at least
less varied) than those for federal courts, which often have to
decide issues of state law because of jurisdictional and Erie-
driven choice-of-law rules.32  These limits on what the SEC
could certify are applicable to all states, including Delaware.  Of
course the SEC could choose not to certify anything.  The point
is just that the pool of cases in which the SEC could exercise its
discretion to certify is limited.
Second, Delaware’s overwhelming predominance in num-
ber and percentage of incorporations nationwide may make
adoption of an SEC certification rule less pressing in any other
jurisdiction.  A recent study found that, as of the beginning of
2000, 57.75% of corporations were incorporated in Delaware,
with the remaining spread among the other, often their home,
states.33  Only 226 of the publicly held corporations studied
were incorporated in New York, as opposed to Delaware’s
3,771.34  New York incorporations amounted to 3.46% of all in-
corporated and publicly traded firms, which, given Delaware’s
overwhelming presence, was the third highest percentage after
Delaware and California.35  These numbers suggest that the
SEC will face fewer interpretations of New York law and that
the SEC might be more likely to certify questions to the Dela-
ware Supreme Court because its decisions will affect more com-
panies and because it has cultivated a particular expertise in
corporate law.36
IV. The Symbolic Value of Expanded Certification
Although the number of incorporations in New York may be
low, allowing certification from the SEC to the New York Court
32. See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adju-
dication, 94 VA. L. REV. 1869, 1873-75 (2008).
33. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorpo-
rate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 390 (2003) (analyzing a dataset of publicly traded firms
headquartered and incorporated in the United States).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1062-63 (2000).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/12
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of Appeals might promote other values.  In particular, such an
amendment would signal to the SEC (and potentially to Dela-
ware) that the New York state courts are available to resolve
these state-law corporate issues.
Certification in general has been touted as “sav[ing] time,
energy and resources and help[ing] build a cooperative judicial
federalism.”37  When federal courts certify questions to state
courts, the efficiency rationale is that certification avoids ab-
stention.38  At least in the context of no-action letters, it is not
clear that the alternative to certification is abstention—the
SEC has long issued these letters on the basis of submitted
opinions of local counsel.39  Moreover, in practice, the efficiency
rationale may not be that persuasive in either case.  At least
one judge has suggested that federal courts often certify ques-
tions where they would not abstain and that certification may
simply be an additional interruption.40
As for “cooperative federalism,” the issue is whether a fed-
eral or state institution appropriately decides questions of state
corporate law.  Certification enhances the control of state courts
by affording those courts additional opportunities to address
state-law questions.  It does not, however, affect which entity
controls the content of state law.  If a federal court or a federal
agency opts not to certify a question, its resulting decision of
state law does not bind state courts, although it may be persua-
sive.41  State courts could decide (and several have decided) that
the federal courts got state law wrong and can proceed to set
them right.42  Similarly, it is difficult to say that a decision by
the SEC whether to issue a no-action letter based on its inter-
pretation of state law affects the content of state law beyond the
actions of the immediate parties.  No-action letters do not bind
Delaware courts as to Delaware law (or New York courts as to
New York law).43
37. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
38. See Kaye & Weissman, supra note 8, at 381.
39. See Nagy, supra note 24, at 923.
40. Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . ., 29 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 677, 687-88 (1995).
41. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal
Court Judges’ Interpretations of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975, 976 (2004).
42. Id. at 978-79.
43. See Nagy, supra note 24, at 923-24.
7
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The nature of the questions, however, may make these ad-
ditional opportunities particularly valuable to states.  Corpo-
rate law—more so than many other areas of the law—has
traditionally been driven by state law.  As the Supreme Court
has repeatedly emphasized, “ ‘Corporations are creatures of
state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate direc-
tors on the understanding that, except where federal law ex-
pressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with
respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal af-
fairs of the corporation.’”44  Moreover, the questions raised
within corporate law may have particularly high stakes; CA,
Inc., for example, concerned the fundamental relationship of
shareholders and directors.45
In addition to the assertion of state control over corporate
law, certification concerns different states’ control over corpo-
rate law.  One way of viewing this proposed amendment would
be as a challenge to the predominance of Delaware in forming
U.S. corporate law.  In the long-standing academic debate over
whether states compete over corporate charters and the effects
of such competition,46 some commentators have concluded that
states do not actually compete for charters,47 but in a way that
is beside the point.  Whether such an amendment would make
sense for New York depends how much the legislature values
asserting that state courts are the appropriate forum for novel
and difficult questions of state corporate law and signaling that
this is as true for New York as it is for Delaware.
44. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (emphasis omit-
ted) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
45. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 231 (Del.
2008).
46. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (arguing that Delaware had led a “race to the
bottom” in corporate law by providing law attractive to managers); Ralph K. Win-
ter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (arguing that state competition for corporate charters
leads to legal rules that provide value to shareholders).
47. See, e.g., Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003)
(arguing that Delaware’s real competition comes from the federal government, not
other states).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/12
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V. The Costs of Amending New York’s Certification Process
The process for amendment is not costless.  As noted above,
the power of New York courts to hear certified questions is
rooted in a constitutional provision enabling court rules of prac-
tice and thus would require constitutional amendment.48  The
New York Constitution details mandatory procedures for such
amendment, whether by the legislature or constitutional con-
vention.49  The basis of the certification power may affect other
states’ evaluation of whether adding the SEC is worth the
trouble.  In particular, states where the power of the state
courts to hear certified questions does not require constitutional
amendment, but rather is based in statute, court rules, or in-
herent powers, may consider the benefits to outweigh the
costs.50
Another difficulty is the content of the amended text.  Tak-
ing Delaware’s lead and adding the SEC to the list might not be
enough.  For one, it may be difficult to say that a question is
“determinative” or “dispositive” when it concerns an SEC no-
action letter, which is nonbinding.  This limitation may, in turn,
renew earlier concerns that certification gives rise to advisory
opinions.51  Finally, to make certification attractive to the SEC,
a commitment to speed might be required.  For example, Dela-
ware decided the CA, Inc., case in three weeks, and the idea
that the question requires “immediate determination” is built
into the text of the Delaware provision.52
VI. Conclusion
An amendment to allow the New York Court of Appeals to
hear certified questions from the SEC may have symbolic value,
regardless of the frequency with which such questions arise.
Whether New York should follow in Delaware’s footsteps de-
48. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(9).
49. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIX; 20 N.Y. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 6 (2008).
50. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1861 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3201 (2008); MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 1:03.
51. See Kaye & Weissman, supra note 8, at 388 (noting that the first reaction
of the New York Court of Appeals to a proposed certification process was that it
involved impermissible advisory opinions).
52. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 231 (Del.
2008).
9
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pends primarily on how highly the New York legislature values
asserting the primacy of state actors over federal actors in the
area of corporate law and challenging Delaware’s tight hold on
the development of corporate law in the United States.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss3/12
